A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

M. Mosquera (), I. García-Jurado and M. Fiestras-Janeiro

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 158, issue 1, 183-188

Abstract: In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483–491, 2003 ). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Keywords: Centralized multi-agent inventory cost situations; Inventory games; Coalitional manipulation; SOC-rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y

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