Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue

M. Llongueras () and Antonio Magaña ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 158, issue 1, 63-79

Abstract: The coordination of strategies in a cooperative game, when some players decide to act together, is the basis of the partnership notion. Nevertheless, in some situations, it may be more convenient to form an effective coalition or alliance. In this work, we consider the Banzhaf semivalue and use it to discuss the convenience to form either partnerships or alliances, especially in simple games. Throughout the paper, some mathematical properties of the Banzhaf semivalue, in relation with the partnership formation, are derived. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Keywords: Cooperative game; Banzhaf semivalue; Partnership; Alliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0245-6

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