The Shapley–Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives

Francesc Carreras () and Antonio Magaña ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 158, issue 1, 97 pages

Abstract: When analyzing mathematically decision mechanisms ruled by voting it is sometimes convenient to include abstention as a possible alternative for the voters. In classical simple games, abstention, if considered, is formally equivalent to voting against the proposal. Simple games with alternatives are useful to study voting systems where abstention does not favour any of the options. In this work, we axiomatically characterize the Shapley–Shubik index for simple games with alternatives and apply it to an example taken from real life. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Keywords: Simple game; Shapley–Shubik index; Game with alternatives; Voting; Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-007-0246-5

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