Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity

Yann Chevaleyre (), Ulle Endriss (), Sylvia Estivie () and Nicolas Maudet ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 163, issue 1, 49-62

Abstract: We study a framework for multiagent resource allocation where autonomous software agents negotiate over the allocation of bundles of indivisible resources. Connections to well-known combinatorial optimisation problems, including the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, shed light on the computational complexity of the framework. We give particular consideration to scenarios where the preferences of agents are modelled in terms of k-additive utility functions, i.e. scenarios where synergies between different resources are restricted to bundles of at most k items. Copyright The Author(s) 2008

Keywords: Resource allocation; Negotiation; Multiagent systems; Preference representation; Computational complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-008-0335-0

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