Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand

Nawel Amrouche, Guiomar Martin-Herran and Georges Zaccour

Annals of Operations Research, 2008, vol. 164, issue 1, 79-95

Abstract: We consider a noncooperative differential game where a retailer sells her own private label in addition to the manufacturer’s brand. We assume that each brand’s goodwill evolves according to a modified Nerlove-Arrow dynamics, in such a way that the advertising effort of one brand hurts the competitor’s goodwill stock. We characterize Feedback-Stackelberg pricing and advertising strategies and employ simulations to analyze their sensitivity to the main model parameters. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Keywords: Marketing channels; Private label; Advertising; Pricing; Differential games; Feedback-Stackelberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-008-0320-7

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