Stability and accuracy functions in a coalition game with bans, linear payoffs and antagonistic strategies

Yury Nikulin ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2009, vol. 172, issue 1, 25-35

Abstract: A coalition game with a finite number of players in which initial coefficients of linear payoff functions are subject to perturbations is considered. For any efficient solution which may appear in the game, appropriate measures of the quality are introduced. These measures correspond to the so-called stability and accuracy functions defined earlier for efficient solutions of a generic multiobjective combinatorial optimization problem with Pareto and lexicographic optimality principles. Various properties of such functions are studied. Maximum norms of perturbations for which an efficient in sense of equilibrium solution preserves the property of being efficient are calculated. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Pareto equilibrium; Stability and accuracy; Coalition game; Quality measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-008-0471-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:172:y:2009:i:1:p:25-35:10.1007/s10479-008-0471-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-008-0471-6

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().