The multichoice coalition value

M. Albizuri ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2009, vol. 172, issue 1, 363-374

Abstract: In this paper we define a solution for multichoice games which is a generalization of the Owen coalition value (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, Springer, New York, pp. 76–88, 1977 ) for transferable utility cooperative games and the Egalitarian solution (Peters and Zanks, Ann. Oper. Res. 137, 399–409, 2005 ) for multichoice games. We also prove that this solution can be seen as a generalization of the configuration value and the dual configuration value (Albizuri et al., Games Econ. Behav. 57, 1–17, 2006 ) for transferable utility cooperative games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Keywords: Shapley value; Multichoice games; Coalition structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-009-0634-0

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