The subcoalition-perfect core of cooperative games

J. Drechsel and A. Kimms ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2010, vol. 181, issue 1, 601 pages

Abstract: The core is a set-valued solution concept for cooperative games. In situations where the characteristic function is not monotone the classical definition may not be sufficient. Hence, we propose a subset of the core that is called subcoalition-perfect core. It will be proven that the subcoalition-perfect core coincides with the set of non-negative core allocations. Furthermore, an ellipsoid algorithm is provided which may be applied in many applications to compute an element in the subcoalition-perfect core. In addition, we discuss an application where the characteristic function is not monotone and perform a computational study. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Core; Mathematical programming; Lot sizing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-010-0789-8

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