Complete voting systems with two classes of voters: weightedness and counting

Josep Freixas (), Xavier Molinero () and Salvador Roura ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 193, issue 1, 273-289

Abstract: We investigate voting systems with two classes of voters, for which there is a hierarchy giving each member of the stronger class more influence or important than each member of the weaker class. We deduce for voting systems one important counting fact that allows determining how many of them are for a given number of voters. In fact, the number of these systems follows a Fibonacci sequence with a smooth polynomial variation on the number of voters. On the other hand, we classify by means of some parameters which of these systems are weighted. This result allows us to state an asymptotic conjecture which is opposed to what occurs for symmetric games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Voting systems; Simple games; Weighted games; Complete simple games; Fibonacci sequence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10479-011-0863-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:193:y:2012:i:1:p:273-289:10.1007/s10479-011-0863-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-011-0863-x

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().