Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions

Amir Danak () and Shie Mannor ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 196, issue 1, 189-199

Abstract: We suggest approximately optimal bidding strategies for games, where similar items are auctioned repeatedly. Considering players’ bounded rationality in practice, the results can further motivate the application of market-based approaches in resource allocation problems. We specialize the bidding algorithm for first-price payment schemes, the building blocks of several simplified selling mechanisms, that are common in practice. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: Mathematical optimization; Approximation methods; Game theory; Bayesian equilibrium; Repeated games; Auctions; Decision-making problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1148-8

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