Overcoming the drawbacks of a revenue-sharing contract through a support program
Pietro Giovanni () and
Maria Roselli
Annals of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 196, issue 1, 222 pages
Abstract:
In a marketing channel governed by goodwill dynamics, players adjust their pricing and advertising strategies when shifting from a wholesale price contract (WPC) to a revenue sharing contract (RSC). We demonstrate that this shift is not payoff-Pareto-improving when the retailer, who is the player transferring the share of revenues, is myopic. Further, we identify the conditions under which the negative effects an RSC creates may be alleviated when the manufacturer offers a support program. Finally, contrarily to operational coordination instruments such as an RSC, a support program always leads to a payoff-Pareto-improving situation and thus should be preferred by firms to reach coordination. Copyright The Author(s) 2012
Keywords: Marketing channel; Contracting; Revenue-sharing contract; Support program; Stackelberg feedback strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1113-6
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