A multiple criteria ranking method based on game cross-evaluation approach

Jie Wu () and Liang Liang

Annals of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 197, issue 1, 200 pages

Abstract: The application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as an alternative multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) tool has been gaining more attentions in the literatures. Doyle (Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 62(1):87–100, 1995 ) presents a method of multi-attribute choice based on an application of DEA. In the first part of his method, the straightforward DEA is considered as an idealized process of self-evaluation in which each alternative weighs the attributes in order to maximize its own score (or desirability) relative to the other alternatives. Then, in the second step, each alternative applies its own DEA-derived best weights to each of the other alternatives (i.e., cross-evaluation), then the average of the cross-evaluations that get placed on an alternative is taken as an index of its overall score. In some cases of multiple criteria decision making, direct or indirect competitions exist among the alternatives, while the factor of competition is usually ignored in most of MCDM settings. This paper proposes an approach to evaluate and rank alternatives in MCDM via an extension of DEA method, namely DEA game cross-efficiency model in Liang, Wu, Cook and Zhu (Oper. Res. 56(5):1278–1288, 2008b ), in which each alternative is viewed as a player who seeks to maximize its own score (or desirability), under the condition that the cross-evaluation scores of each of other alternatives does not deteriorate. The game cross-evaluation score is obtained when the alternative’s own maximized scores are averaged. The obtained game cross-evaluation scores are unique and constitute a Nash equilibrium point. Therefore, the results and rankings based upon game cross-evaluation score analysis are more reliable and will benefit the decision makers. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Keywords: MCDM; DEA; Self-evaluation; Cross-evaluation; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-010-0817-8

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