Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series

Apostolos Burnetas ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2013, vol. 208, issue 1, 515-529

Abstract: We consider series of M/M/m queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Keywords: Series queues; Customer equilibrium strategies; Welfare maximization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4

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