Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders

T. Andersson (), C. Andersson and Adolphus Talman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tommy Andersson

Annals of Operations Research, 2013, vol. 211, issue 1, 27-36

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called “sets in excess demand” is introduced, and the main result demonstrates that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Multi-item auctions; Unit-demand; Excess demand; Algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1

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