Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations

Hans-Peter Weikard and Rob Dellink

Annals of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 220, issue 1, 49-68

Abstract: This paper examines renegotiations of international climate agreements for carbon abatement. We explore coalition stability under ‘optimal transfers’ that have been suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (e.g. McGinty in Oxford Economic Papers 59, 45–62, 2007 ). Such transfer schemes need to be refined when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the requirements that transfers between signatories of an international climate agreement must satisfy in order to stabilise the sequence of agreements that performs best in terms of provision of the public good ‘carbon abatement’. If these requirements are met, no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our result we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of well-designed transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations if renegotations take place sufficiently early. Copyright The Author(s) 2014

Keywords: Stability of coalitions; International environmental agreements; Partition function approach; Sharing rules; Renegotiations; Climate agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations (2008)
Working Paper: Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-010-0795-x

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