Game theoretic formalization of the concept of sustainable development in the hierarchical control systems

Guennady Ougolnitsky ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 220, issue 1, 69-86

Abstract: The resolution of numerous ecological problems on different levels must be implemented on the base of sustainable development concept that determines the conditions to the state of ecological-economic systems and impacting control actions. Those conditions can’t be realized by themselves and require special collaborative efforts of different agents using both cooperation and hierarchical control. To formalize the inevitable trade-offs it is natural to use game theoretic models. Unfortunately, the main optimality principles of hierarchical control (compulsion, impulsion) are not time consistent and therefore can’t be recommended as the direct base for collective solutions. The most prospective is the conviction method which is formalized as a transition from hierarchy to cooperation and allows a regularization that provides the time consistency. However, in current social conditions other methods of hierarchical control also keep their actuality. To ensure the time consistency of those optimality principles it is necessary to build cooperative differential games on their base. An example of the approach is considered in this paper. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Keywords: Differential games; Sustainable development; Cooperation; Time consistency; Hierarchical control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-012-1090-9

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