Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum

Josep Freixas () and Sascha Kurz ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 222, issue 1, 317-339

Abstract: This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class as well. Second, we focus on the special case of bipartite complete games with minimum, and we compare and rank these games according to the behavior of some efficient power indices of players of type 1 (or of type 2). The main result of this second part establishes all allowable rankings of these games when the Shapley-Shubik power index is used on players of type 1. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Simple game; Weighted and complete games; Enumerations; Shapley-Shubik power index; Banzhaf power indices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-013-1348-x

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