Coalition configurations and share functions
Nicolas Andjiga () and
Sébastien Courtin
Annals of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 225, issue 1, 3-25
Abstract:
Albizuri and Aurrekoetxea (Soc Choice Welf 26:571–596, 2006a ) and Albizuri et al. (Games Econ Behav 57:1–17, 2006b ) defined values for games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition configuration. In games with coalition configuration, we suppose that players organize themselves into coalitions that are not necessarily disjoint. A player can belong to more than one a priori coalition. In this paper we redefine coalition configuration values by using the concept of share function, as introduced by van der Laan and van den Brink (Theory Decis 53:61–86, 2002 ). A share function assigns to every player in a game its share in the worth to be distributed. We also define and characterize a general class of share function for games with coalition configuration which contains among other values those introduced by Albizuri et al. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015
Keywords: Coalition configuration; Coalition structure; Share function; Shapley value; Banzhaf value; C70; C71; D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1754-8
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