A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

M. Albizuri (), J. Echarri () and J. Zarzuelo ()
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J. Zarzuelo: http://www.ehu.es/zarzuelo

Annals of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 235, issue 1, 11 pages

Abstract: In this paper we address the question of how to allocate the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users based on a non-cooperative approach. We present a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique Nash equilibrium outcome whose payoffs are the Shapley value of an airport problem. Furthermore, it is shown that all strategy profiles leading to a subgame perfect equilibrium in these games are also coalition-proof. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Cost allocation; Airport problem; Non-cooperative mechanism; Nash program; Cooperative games; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7

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