Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof

Miklós Pintér ()

Annals of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 235, issue 1, 665-673

Abstract: We give a new proof of Young’s characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value is valid on various well-known subclasses of $$\textit{TU}$$ TU games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: TU cooperative games; Shapley value; Axiomatization of the Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-015-1859-8

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