Worst-case analysis of non-cooperative load balancing

Olivier Brun () and Balakrishna Prabhu ()
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Olivier Brun: CNRS
Balakrishna Prabhu: CNRS

Annals of Operations Research, 2016, vol. 239, issue 2, No 7, 495 pages

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the impact of heterogeneity in the amount of incoming traffic routed by dispatchers in a non-cooperative load balancing game. For a fixed amount of total incoming traffic, we show that for a broad class of cost functions the worst-case social cost occurs when each dispatcher routes the same amount of traffic, that is, the game is symmetric. Using this result, we give lower bounds on the Price of Anarchy for (i) cost functions that are polynomial on server loads; and (ii) cost functions representing the mean delay of the shortest remaining processing time service discipline.

Keywords: Atomic games; Load balancing; Symmetric games; Price of anarchy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1747-7

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