A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption

Roy Cerqueti and Raffaella Coppier ()
Additional contact information
Raffaella Coppier: University of Macerata

Annals of Operations Research, 2016, vol. 243, issue 1, No 6, 87 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we construct a theoretical game model with incomplete information to analyze the tax revenues of a multiethnic country, when fiscal corruption is widespread. Our proposal is that income inequality between ethnic groups causes differences leading to prejudice and discrimination among ethnic groups themselves and, as a consequence, this affects the control of corruption and evasion. Hence, the amount of tax revenues is proven to be dependent on the relevance of the income distribution between the ethnic groups.

Keywords: Game theory; Corruption; Tax evasion; Tax revenues; Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; Income inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:243:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-014-1567-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().