An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure

René Brink (), Anna Khmelnitskaya () and Gerard van der Laan
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René Brink: VU University
Anna Khmelnitskaya: Saint-Petersburg State University

Annals of Operations Research, 2016, vol. 243, issue 1, No 11, 179-198

Abstract: Abstract We introduce an Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, which is a structure where the players are partitioned into a coalition structure such that there exists restricted communication between as well as within the a priori unions of the coalition structure. Both types of communication restrictions are modeled by an undirected communication graph. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the new value using an efficiency, two types of fairness (one for each level of the communication structure), and a new type of axiom, called fair distribution of the surplus within unions, which compares the effect of replacing a union in the coalition structure by one of its maximal connected components on the payoffs of these components. The relevance of the new value is illustrated by an example. We also show that for particular two-level communication structures the Owen value and the Aumann–Drèze value for games with coalition structure, the Myerson value for communication graph games, and the equal surplus division solution appear as special cases of this new value.

Keywords: TU game; Coalition structure; Communication graph; Owen value; Myerson value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-015-1808-6

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