 Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the coresAnnals of Operations Research, 2017, vol. 248, issue 1, No 14, 345-363 Abstract: Abstract In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the $$\gamma $$ γ -approach. First, we analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an endogenous real interval. Second, the Hurwicz criterion turns out to be a key concept to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of the induced core solution concepts: the interval and the standard $$\gamma $$ γ -cores. The first condition permits to ascertain that even for linear and symmetric industries the interval $$\gamma $$ γ -core is empty. Moreover, by means of the approximation technique of quadratic Bézier curves we prove that the second condition always holds, hence the standard $$\gamma $$ γ -core is non-empty, under natural properties of profit and cost functions. Keywords: Interval game; Oligopoly; $$\gamma $$ γ -Cores; Hurwicz criterion; Quadratic Bézier curve (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:248:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2211-7 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7 Access Statistics for this article Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer |
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