Game theoretical transportation network design among multiple regions

Hua Wang and Xiaoning Zhang ()
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Hua Wang: Tongji University
Xiaoning Zhang: Tongji University

Annals of Operations Research, 2017, vol. 249, issue 1, No 7, 97-117

Abstract: Abstract Previous studies of transportation network design assumed that transportation network was managed by a central administrative authority with an objective of improving the performance of the whole network. In practice, the transportation network may comprise of multiple local regions, which are independently and separately managed by local transportation administrative authorities with different objectives. Therefore, it is possible that local authorities may act with different behaviours, either cooperatively or competitively, in designing transportation networks. This paper addresses various network design strategies, such as competitive, cooperative, chronological, Stackelberg and the mixed schemes. Multiple-level games are used to describe the behaviours of different regions. The proposed NDP models are used to describe various game behaviours of regional authorities that evaluate the NDP effects more reasonably. It can also be used to assess the impact of regional budget distribution and help the central authority make reasonable budget distribution scheme.

Keywords: Discrete network design problem; Competition; Cooperation; Chronological design scheme; Stackelberg game; Multiple regions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1700-9

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