The search value of a set

Robbert Fokkink (), Ken Kikuta () and David Ramsey ()
Additional contact information
Robbert Fokkink: Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics
Ken Kikuta: University of Hyogo

Annals of Operations Research, 2017, vol. 256, issue 1, No 5, 63-73

Abstract: Abstract We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the order in which the locations are searched. From these assumptions we derive that the cost function is submodular, thus placing search games with an immobile hider in the context of coalitional games.

Keywords: Search game; Submodular function; Zero-sum game; Coalitional game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:256:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2252-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().