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Two-stage security screening strategies in the face of strategic applicants, congestions and screening errors

Cen Song and Jun Zhuang ()
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Cen Song: China University of Petroleum

Annals of Operations Research, 2017, vol. 258, issue 2, No 4, 237-262

Abstract: Abstract In a security screening system, a tighter screening policy not only increases the security level, but also causes congestion for normal people, which may deter their use and decrease the approver’s payoff. Adapting to the screening policies, adversary and normal applicants choose whether to enter the screening system. Security managers could use screening policies to deter adversary applicants, but could also lose the benefits of admitting normal applicants when they are deterred, which generates a tradeoff. This paper analyzes the optimal screening policies in an imperfect two-stage screening system with potential screening errors at each stage, balancing security and congestion in the face of strategic normal and adversary applicants. We provide the optimal levels of screening strategies for the approver and the best-response application strategies for each type of applicant. This paper integrates game theory and queueing theory to study the optimal two-stage policies under discriminatory and non-discriminatory screening policies. We extend the basic model to the optimal allocation of total service rate to the assumed two types of applicants at the second stage and find that most of the total service rate are assigned to the service rate for the assumed “Bad” applicants. This paper provides some novel policy insights which may be useful for security screening practices.

Keywords: Security screening policy; Two-stage queueing network; Waiting time; Game theory; Imperfect screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-015-2043-x

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