Representation-compatible power indices
Serguei Kaniovski () and
Sascha Kurz ()
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Serguei Kaniovski: Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)
Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth
Annals of Operations Research, 2018, vol. 264, issue 1, 235-265
Abstract This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of null voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. In this paper we introduce two computationally cheaper alternatives to the existing representation-compatible power indices, and study the properties of a family that now comprises four measures.
Keywords: First average representation; Power index; Proportionality between weights and power; 91A12; 91A80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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