Correction to: On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games

Sascha Kurz ()
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Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth

Annals of Operations Research, 2018, vol. 271, issue 2, No 33, 1087-1089

Abstract: A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (nonnegative) weights of the “yea” voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum, where the weights and the quota are restricted to be integers. Here we correct the classification of all weighted voting games consisting of 9 voters which do not admit a unique minimum sum integer weight representation.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-2893-0

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