Decentralization versus coordination in competing supply chains under retailers’ extended warranties
Jianhua Ma (),
Xingzheng Ai (),
Wen Yang () and
Yanchun Pan ()
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Jianhua Ma: Shenzhen University
Xingzheng Ai: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Wen Yang: Shenzhen University
Yanchun Pan: Shenzhen University
Annals of Operations Research, 2019, vol. 275, issue 2, No 10, 485-510
Abstract This paper studies a two-tier duopoly competing supply chain system consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers. Both manufacturers produce differentiated products and both retailers provide extended warranties for the products they sell. Two types of channel-structure strategy options are considered: a decentralized structure with a wholesale price contract and a coordinated structure with a sophisticated contract. We first derive the equilibrium outcomes under three possible chain-to-chain competition scenarios. Subsequently, we reveal how manufacturers control their retail channels to gain more supply chain system profit under an interactive environment with supply chain competition and retailers’ extended warranties. We find that pure coordinated channel competition and pure decentralized channel competition may both reach equilibrium. Furthermore, the interaction forces of supply chain competition and extended warranty service significantly impact the characteristics of the equilibria. Finally, we analyze the competing supply chain’s coordination contract design by using the example of a two-part tariff contract, and determine the feasible contract parameter range that results in a win-win solution for supply chain members.
Keywords: Supply chain competition; Extended warranty; Channel structure; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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