# Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products

Aymeric Lardon ()
Aymeric Lardon: Université Côte d’Azur

Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 1, No 12, 285-302

Abstract: Abstract We consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the demand system is Shubik’s and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost. Our main results state that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in $$\alpha$$α, $$\beta$$β and $$\gamma$$γ-characteristic function form satisfy the convexity property, meaning that there exist strong incentives for large-scale cooperation between firms on prices.

Keywords: Bertrand competition; Cooperation; Core; Convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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