Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
Aymeric Lardon ()
Additional contact information
Aymeric Lardon: Université Côte d’Azur
Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 1, No 12, 285-302
Abstract We consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the demand system is Shubik’s and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost. Our main results state that Bertrand oligopoly TU-games in $$\alpha $$α, $$\beta $$β and $$\gamma $$γ-characteristic function form satisfy the convexity property, meaning that there exist strong incentives for large-scale cooperation between firms on prices.
Keywords: Bertrand competition; Cooperation; Core; Convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-019-03351-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:287:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-019-03351-7
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros
More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().