Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets

Dharini Hingu ()
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Dharini Hingu: Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 2, No 10, 737-749

Abstract: Abstract In this article, we study in detail asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable faces generated by finite Borel sets in a continuous strategy space of an evolutionary game. It is proved that such a face is an asymptotically stable set for the associated replicator dynamics. This result is illustrated using examples.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionarily stable sets; Replicator dynamics; Asymptotic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-017-2695-9

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