Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms

Cristian Litan (), Francisco Marhuenda () and Peter Sudhölter
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Cristian Litan: Babeş-Bolyai University
Francisco Marhuenda: University Carlos III of Madrid

Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 2, No 14, 810 pages

Abstract: Abstract We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.

Keywords: Outcome game form; Completely mixed Nash equilibrium; Generic finiteness; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Distributions for Bimatrix Outcome Game Forms (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-2854-7

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