On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games

Dharini Hingu (), K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao () and A. J. Shaiju ()
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Dharini Hingu: Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao: Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
A. J. Shaiju: Indian Institute of Technology, Madras

Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 287, issue 2, No 11, 760 pages

Abstract: Abstract We revisit some concepts of superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games with continuous strategy space. We prove a general stability result for replicator trajectories by introducing the concept of superiority with respect to a given closed set. Some important results in the literature regarding weak stability turn out to be special cases of our main result.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Replicator dynamics; Games with continuous strategy space (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-018-2971-3

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