On benefits of cooperation under strategic power

M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro (), I. García-Jurado (), A. Meca () and M. A. Mosquera ()
Additional contact information
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
I. García-Jurado: Universidade da Coruña
A. Meca: Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche
M. A. Mosquera: Universidade de Vigo

Annals of Operations Research, 2020, vol. 288, issue 1, No 11, 285-306

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated with the population. This is what we call a TU-game with strategies. We propose and characterize the maxmin procedure to map every game with strategies to a TU-game. We also study whether or not the relevant properties of TU-games are transmitted by applying the maxmin procedure. Finally, we examine two relevant classes of TU-games with strategies: airport and simple games with strategies.

Keywords: Game theory; Cooperative games; Maxmin procedure; Strategies; Airport games; Simple games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:288:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-019-03495-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-019-03495-6

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().