Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: how Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism

Lina Mallozzi () and Juan Vidal-Puga
Additional contact information
Lina Mallozzi: Università di Napoli Federico II

Annals of Operations Research, 2021, vol. 301, issue 1, No 10, 143-159

Abstract: Abstract We study cooperative interval games. These are cooperative games where the value of a coalition is given by a closed real interval specifying a lower bound and an upper bound of the possible outcome. For interval cooperative games, several (interval) solution concepts have been introduced in the literature. We assume that each player has a different attitude towards uncertainty by means of the so-called Hurwicz coefficients. These coefficients specify the degree of optimism that each player has so that an interval becomes a specific payoff. We show that a classical cooperative game arises when applying the Hurwicz criterion to each interval game. On the other hand, the same Hurwicz criterion can also be applied to any interval solution of the interval cooperative game. Given this, we say that a solution concept is Hurwicz compatible if the two procedures provide the same final payoff allocation. When such compatibility is possible, we characterize the class of compatible solutions, which reduces to the egalitarian solution when symmetry is required. The Shapley value and the core solution cases are also discussed.

Keywords: Cooperative interval games; Hurwicz criterion; Hurwicz compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-019-03379-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Uncertainty in cooperative interval games: How Hurwicz criterion compatibility leads to egalitarianism (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:301:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-019-03379-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-019-03379-9

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().