Games and cost of change

Sjur Didrik Flåm ()
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Sjur Didrik Flåm: The University of Bergen

Annals of Operations Research, 2021, vol. 301, issue 1, No 8, 107-119

Abstract: Abstract Most microeconomic and game theoretic models of individual choice overlook adjustment costs. Rather often, the modeler’s concern is just with improvement of objectives. This optic doesn’t quite fit agents somewhat tied to status quo. If rational, any such agent reasons whether moving to another state be worth his while. For that, the realized gains must outweigh the inconveniences of the move. Choosing games as chief setting, this paper offers some observations as to the fact that strategy change usually entails cost.

Keywords: Adjustment costs; Proximal methods; Stationary states; Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03585-w

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