Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games

Aradhana Narang () and A. J. Shaiju
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Aradhana Narang: Indian Institute of Technology Madras
A. J. Shaiju: Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Annals of Operations Research, 2021, vol. 304, issue 1, No 13, 343-359

Abstract: Abstract The concept of a face of population states arises naturally in evolutionary games. This paper studies faces of profiles in asymmetric evolutionary games with infinite strategy space. The concepts of strong immovable and immutable faces of profiles are introduced and stability results for these faces are discussed.

Keywords: Asymmetric evolutionary games; Replicator dynamics; Games with infinite strategy space; Strong immovable and immutable faces; Lyapunov stability; Weak attracting; 91A22; 91A10; 34A34; 34G20; 34D20; 92D25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04157-2

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