Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium and quasi harmonic games

Lina Mallozzi () and Armando Sacco ()
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Lina Mallozzi: University of Naples Federico II
Armando Sacco: University of Naples “Parthenope”

Annals of Operations Research, 2022, vol. 318, issue 2, No 15, 1029-1041

Abstract: Abstract Security solutions for two stage games, where the second stage consists of a strategic form noncooperative game, are not reachable in many problems. The aim of this paper is to investigate such solutions. Mixed extension for the second stage game is considered and existence results for approximate mixed security solutions, together with the convergences of values, are given and illustrated by significative examples. The results apply to the class of quasi harmonic games.

Keywords: Security solutions; Mixed Nash equilibrium; Quasi harmonic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03916-x

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