An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation

Marta Biancardi (), Gianluca Iannucci () and Giovanni Villani ()
Additional contact information
Marta Biancardi: University of Bari
Gianluca Iannucci: University of Firenze
Giovanni Villani: University of Bari

Annals of Operations Research, 2022, vol. 318, issue 2, No 6, 847 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies how to counter the illegal exploitation of common groundwater resource in an evolutionary game approach. The access is not free and firms have to pay a royalty depending on the quantity of water pumped. However, some firms could decide to not pay the royalty and face the risk of being sanctioned by the regulator authority. The overall sanction is composed of a fixed amount and of the royalty not payed. From the analysis of the model it emerges that coexistence at the equilibrium between compliant and non-compliant firms is possible and policy instruments are partially able to counter the unauthorized exploitation. In particular, increasing the sanction level reduces the number of non-compliant firms but raises the incidence of illegal pumping. The opposite occurs if the regulatory authority increases the royalty price. To pursue both goals, applying a balance of policies is necessary.

Keywords: Groundwater extraction; Evolutionary game; Illegal behaviors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-021-04297-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:318:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-021-04297-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04297-5

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().