Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation

Guillermo Owen () and Francesc Carreras ()
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Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School
Francesc Carreras: Polytechnic University of Catalonia

Annals of Operations Research, 2022, vol. 318, issue 2, No 18, 1095-1115

Abstract: Abstract We consider n-person games in which players are located in some Euclidean space. These locations represent affinity between players. Thus there are two reasons why coalitions might form: (a) the members are close together, and/or (b) there is much to be gained from a coalition. We determine, in such case, which coalitions are more likely to form. We also model how players are likely to move in this space, so that stronger coalitions might form.

Keywords: Games; Coalitions; Affinity; Values; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04493-3

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