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Some game theoretic marketing attribution models

Elisenda Molina (), Juan Tejada () and Tom Weiss ()
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Elisenda Molina: Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Juan Tejada: Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Tom Weiss: MarketCast LCC

Annals of Operations Research, 2022, vol. 318, issue 2, No 16, 1043-1075

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretic approaches to design attribution mechanisms for multi-channel marketing campaigns. Both approaches are based on a key performance index function that provides the benefit obtained in each of the observed paths to conversion. The first approach considers the problem as a cooperative transferable utility game, and the proposed attribution mechanisms are based on the Shapley value. The second approach models the problem as a bankruptcy problem and the proposed attribution mechanism is based on the constrained equal-losses rule. We also extend the above approaches to deal with the cases in which the position or the repetition of the channels on the paths to conversion are taken into account.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Marketing; Multi-channel attribution; Shapley value; Bankruptcy problems; Constrained equal-losses rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-022-04944-5

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