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Efficient extensions of the Myerson value based on endogenous claims from players

Rong Zou (), Genjiu Xu () and Dongshuang Hou ()
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Rong Zou: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Genjiu Xu: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Dongshuang Hou: Northwestern Polytechnical University

Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 323, issue 1, No 13, 287-300

Abstract: Abstract We achieve two efficient extensions of the Myerson value by introducing the Shapley value of the original game as endogenous claims of players. Capturing the feature of insufficiency in the surplus to be divided, we identify a graph-induced bankruptcy problem. Two classical bankruptcy rules, namely the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule, are employed to efficiently extend the Myerson value, which correspondingly brings about the efficient constrained equal awards Myerson value and the efficient constrained equal losses Myerson value. The two efficient graph game values are characterized by axiomatic approaches.

Keywords: Efficient extension; Myerson value; Bankruptcy problem; Constrained equal awards; Constrained equal losses; 91A12; 91A43; 05C57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05221-9

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