Optimal seedings in interdependent contests

Chen Cohen (), Ishay Rabi () and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Chen Cohen: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Ishay Rabi: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 328, issue 2, No 4, 1263-1285

Abstract: Abstract We study a model of two interdependent contests and heterogeneous players with commonly known types. The winners of both contests have winning values that depend on the types (abilities) of both winners. Therefore, endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on the outcomes of the other contests through the identity of the winner. The designer seeds players according to their types in order to maximize (minimize) the total effort. For such interdependent contests, each of which includes two heterogeneous players, we consider two different types of a winning value function and demonstrate that for multiplicative value functions it is optimal to place the two highest type players in different contests. On the other hand, for additive value functions it is optimal to place the two highest type players in the same contest since otherwise they practically do not affect each other.

Keywords: Seedings; Tullock contest; Interdependent contests; Heterogeneous players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-023-05373-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Seedings in Interdependent Contests (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:annopr:v:328:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-023-05373-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10479

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05373-8

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Operations Research is currently edited by Endre Boros

More articles in Annals of Operations Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().