Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index for simple multichoice voting games

Bertrand Mbama Engoulou (), Pierre Wambo and Lawrence Diffo Lambo
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Bertrand Mbama Engoulou: The University of Douala
Pierre Wambo: Ecole Normale Superieure
Lawrence Diffo Lambo: Ecole Normale Superieure

Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 328, issue 2, No 7, 1349-1364

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we extend the Banzhaf–Coleman–Dubey–Shapley sensitivity index to the class of dichotomous voting games with several levels of approval in input, also known as (j, 2)-simple games. For previous works, on classical simple games ((2, 2)-simple games), a sensitivity index reflects the volatility or degree of suspense in the voting body. Using a set of independent axioms, we provide an axiomatic characterization of that extension on the class of (j, 2)-simple games.

Keywords: Game theory; Sensitivity index; $$\ (j; k)$$ ( j; k ) -Simple games; Several levels of approval; Banzhaf power index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05411-5

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