The antagonism and cohesion of the upstream supply chain under information asymmetry

Aijun Liu, Senhao Luo, Jian Mou () and Hongwei Qiu
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Aijun Liu: Xidian University
Senhao Luo: Xidian University
Jian Mou: Pusan National University
Hongwei Qiu: Xidian University

Annals of Operations Research, 2023, vol. 329, issue 1, No 19, 527-572

Abstract: Abstract Information asymmetry leads to short-term competitive antagonism between downstream manufacturers and upstream suppliers. This paper applies a master-slave game to reproduce the interest conflict between a manufacturer and a supplier, and proposes a cooperative decision-making model based on information sharing, considering the interest consistency of upstream supply chain members. Additionally, the overall profit coordination mechanism is constructed to ensure the continuation of the cooperative decision-making relationship. In addition, to ensure that the supplier participating in cooperative decision-making has the supply capacity desired by the manufacturer, a rational evaluation system combined with game theory is employed to determine the most suitable participating supplier. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the systematization and effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis, managerial insights and recommendations are obtained.

Keywords: Information asymmetry; Master-slave game; Profit coordination mechanism; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03881-5

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