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Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices

Livino M. Armijos-Toro (), José M. Alonso-Meijide and Manuel A. Mosquera
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Livino M. Armijos-Toro: University of Santiago de Compostela
José M. Alonso-Meijide: University of Santiago de Compostela, Campus de Lugo
Manuel A. Mosquera: Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa

Annals of Operations Research, 2024, vol. 336, issue 3, No 2, 1373-1393

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer–Martínez power index (Colomer and Martínez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41–63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262–271, 1982) and Colomer–Martínez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.

Keywords: Weighted majority games; Mergeability; Power indices; Axiomatic characterizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05340-3

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