Expected values for variable network games

Subhadip Chakrabarti, Loyimee Gogoi (), Robert P. Gilles (), Surajit Borkotokey () and Rajnish Kumar ()
Additional contact information
Loyimee Gogoi: Ahmedabad University
Robert P. Gilles: Queen’s University Belfast
Surajit Borkotokey: Dibrugarh University
Rajnish Kumar: Queen’s University Belfast

Annals of Operations Research, 2024, vol. 336, issue 3, No 27, 2089 pages

Abstract: Abstract A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a network formation probability distribution, describing certain restrictions on network formation. Expected levels of collectively generated wealth and expected individual payoffs can be formulated in this setting. We investigate properties of the resulting expected wealth levels as well as the expected variants of well-established network game values as allocation rules that assign to every variable network game a payoff to the players in a variable network game. We establish two axiomatizations of the Expected Myerson Value, originally formulated and proven on the class of communication situations, based on the well-established component balance, equal bargaining power and balanced contributions properties. Furthermore, we extend an established axiomatization of the Position Value based on the balanced link contribution property to the Expected Position Value.

Keywords: Network game; Variable network game; Network formation probabilities; Expected Myerson Value; Expected Position Value; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Expected Values for Variable Network Games (2022)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-023-05530-z

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