The allowable value for cooperative games with restricted permutations

Xianghui Li, Bin Jiang () and Yang Li
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Xianghui Li: Henan University of Technology
Bin Jiang: Jiaxing Nanhu University
Yang Li: Henan University of Technology

Annals of Operations Research, 2024, vol. 340, issue 2, No 9, 943-959

Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces a new framework for cooperative games with restricted permutations, focusing on situations where not all possible player permutations occur. The framework allows players within an ordered coalition to exchange positions if it benefits them. To ensure stable connections among players, we introduce the concept of stably connected ordered coalitions, which incorporates the notions of objection and counter-objection. We then define an order-restricted game, a generalized characteristic function game derived from the original game. Additionally, inspired by the Shapley value, we propose an allowable value and provide its axiomatization. Finally, we explore several extensions of this value to further investigate its potential applications.

Keywords: Objection; Order restricted game; Allowable value; Satisfaction degree (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-06081-7

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