A dynamic cost compensation mechanism driven by moderator preferences for group consensus in lending platforms

Yanli Meng (), Li Wang (), Francisco Chiclana (), Haijun Yang () and Sha Wang ()
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Yanli Meng: Beihang University
Li Wang: Beihang University
Francisco Chiclana: De Montfort University
Haijun Yang: Beihang University
Sha Wang: Kunming University of Science and Technology

Annals of Operations Research, 2025, vol. 347, issue 3, No 9, 1425-1454

Abstract: Abstract The matching service the lending platform (moderator) provides acts as a facilitative conduit for reaching a loan consensus, facilitating agreements among multiple lenders and borrowers (decision makers). In light of the reality that decision-makers exhibit varying sensitivities to compensation expectations in response to opinion adjustment, the moderator’s demonstration of a preferred compensation mechanism determines the efficiency of the matching service. This article proposes a dynamic cost compensation mechanism driven by moderator preferences for group consensus in lending platforms. Firstly, the utility function describes adjusters’ preferences, defining three unit cost compensation preferences: Power-type I, II and right-partial S-shaped preferences. Subsequently, we construct a generalized dynamic minimum-cost consensus decision model to determine the optimal unit compensation strategies within the opinion interval delineated by the moderator. For the likelihood of equitable concerns arising from fluctuations in unit compensation costs, we enforce the fairness of the compensation strategy by incorporating the Gini coefficient as a constraint within the consensus model. To validate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed models, we apply the proposed models to online lending utilizing data obtained from an online peer-to-peer lending platform.

Keywords: Group decision making; Loan consensus modelling; Consensus reaching process; Dynamic cost compensation; Lending platforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-06424-4

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